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We employ cross-country and dynamic panel data techniques on a rich data set containing 
six financial development indicators, a number of alternative proxies for financial and trade 
openness and institutional quality indicators for 43 developing during 1980 - 2000. Our 
findings provide support to the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis which suggests that 
financial development is facilitated when a country’s borders are opened to both capital flows 
and trade. We also find that institutional quality is a robust and statistically significant 
independent determinant of financial development, providing support to the case made by 
Arestis and Demetriades (1997, 1999). Our findings relate to all the indicators of financial 
development employed (both banking and capital market) and are robust to alternative 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Financial markets and institutions perform an important function in the economic 
development process, particularly through their role in allocating finance to various productive 
activities, including investment in new plant and equipment, working capital for firms etc. This 
role has been well researched and documented in the empirical literature, using a variety of 
econometric techniques. By and large, empirical studies suggest that well-functioning 
financial institutions and markets promote long-run economic growth (King and Levine, 
1993a, b; Levine, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 
Demetriades and Andrianova, 2004; and Goodhart, 2004).  Levine (2003) provides an 
excellent overview of a large body of empirical literature that suggests that financial 
development can robustly explain differences in economic growth across countries. 
Nevertheless, an interesting question remains why, if financial development is so good for 
growth, have so many countries remained financially under-developed? More broadly, why 
have some economies developed well-functioning financial markets and institutions, while 
others have not?  
 
Through arduous data collection from 49 countries and careful analysis, La Porta et 
al. (1997) substantially advance research into the legal determinants of financial 
development. Specifically, they explore the contribution of a country’s legal origin in the 
formation of its financial structure and its corporate governance institutions.  They find that 
legal origin – be it English common law, or French, German or Scandinavian civil law – partly 
determines the quality of investor protection and the relative size of the stock market vis-à-vis 
the banking system. They find that English common law systems generally have the strongest 
investor protection enforcement, followed by Germany, Scandinavian, and lastly, French civil 
systems. Another point of view that discusses the differences across countries financial 
development is the endowment theory of institutions proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
These authors argue that the disease environment encountered by colonizers influenced the 
formation of long-lasting institutions that helped to shape financial development. Beck et al. 
(2003) examine both the law and endowment historical determinants of financial 
development, and find that the empirical results provide support for both theories. 
Nevertheless, initial endowments tend to explain more of the cross-country variation in 
financial intermediary and stock market development.  
 
Though the law and finance and endowment theory are the two leading explanations 
for the variance in the proficiency of financial depth across countries, a third rationale is, more 
recently, also gaining momentum. Rajan and Zingales (2003) analyse the importance of 
interest group politics in influencing financial development. According to them, politics, driven 
by special-interest groups representing established business, can explain this uneven 
evolution of capital markets. They propose an “interest group” theory of financial development   3
where incumbents oppose financial development because it produces fewer benefits for them 
than for potential competitors. The incumbents will shape policies and institutions to their own 
advantage when they gain power. Incumbents can finance investment opportunities mainly 
with retained earnings, whereas potential competitors need external capital to start up. Thus, 
when a country is open to trade and capital flows, it is more likely to deliver benefits to 
financial development because openness to both trade and finance breeds competition and 
threatens the rents of incumbents. In other words, open borders help to check the political 
and economic elites and preserve competitive markets. Globalisation forces countries to do 
what is necessary to make their economies productive, not what is best for incumbent elites.  
 
Pagano and Volpin (2001) also highlight the importance of politics in influencing 
financial markets by illustrating a few historical examples from Europe and the US of how 
politics can affect the financial development policies. They survey the literature on corporate 
governance structures by examining the ability of political economy methodology to analyse 
the economic regulations and financial institutions that result from the balance of power 
between the constituents of society. The main insights of the political economy approach is 
that it explains international differences in financial policy by describing ‘which constituencies 
are assuming a certain regulatory outcome, why they are currently dictating the rules, and 
how and why the balance of power can shift against them. Another study that takes into 
account political economy factors in influencing financial openness is Quinn and Inclan 
(1997), which points out that differences in both political institutional arrangements and type 
of political economy also account for part of the differences in international financial 
regulation. However, the influence of political determinants has also had its critics.  Beck et al. 
(2001), for example, question the importance of politics in explaining financial structure. Using 
principal component analysis to measure political structure, which consists of competitiveness 
in elections, government openness, and inter-party competition, they find a weak link between 
politics and finance. 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence pertaining to the Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
hypothesis, namely that openness to both trade and capital flows has a positive influence on 
financial development. If true, this hypothesis has very important policy implications, namely it 
calls for simultaneous trade and financial liberalisation. This would run contrary to the 
sequencing literature, which advocates that trade liberalisation should precede financial 
liberalisation and that capital account opening should be the last stage in the liberalisation 
process (e.g. McKinnon, 1991).   
 
So far the evidence on the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis remains limited. 
The sample of countries used by Rajan and Zingales themselves, dictated by limited data 
availability in the pre-World War II period, means that their conclusions are, at best, very 
tentative. Other authors have examined related questions but have not examined the Rajan-  4
Zingales hypothesis directly. Levine (2001), for example, finds that liberalising restrictions on 
international portfolio flows tends to enhance stock market liquidity, and allowing greater 
foreign bank presence tends to enhance the efficiency of the domestic banking system. Chinn 
and Ito (2002) show that there is a strong relationship between capital controls and financial 
development. Their finding holds for less developed countries in terms of stock market value 
traded, and even more so for emerging market economies. Klein and Olivei (1999) point out 
that capital account liberalisation has a substantial impact on growth via the deepening of a 
country’s financial system in highly industrialised countries, but there is little evidence of 
financial liberalisation promoting financial development outside members of the OECD. In 
terms of trade openness, Beck (2003) shows that countries with better-developed financial 
systems have higher shares of manufactured exports in GDP and in total merchandise 
exports. Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) find that there is a positive interdependence between 
financial development and liberal trade policies.  
 
This paper represents an advance over previous empirical literature in a number of 
important respects. First, it provides a direct test of the Rajan and Zingales hypothesis using 
appropriately specified financial development equations. These equations control not only for 
the conventional determinants of financial development (real GDP and real interest rate) but 
also for institutional quality, an emerging important variable in recent studies (See, for 
example, Demetriades and Andrianova, 2004). Second, it uses data set that is sufficiently 
large to enable robust conclusions to be drawn from the econometric results; specifically, the 
sample utilised in this paper consists of annual data from 43 developing countries, covering 
the period 1980 – 2000. Third, the time dimension of our data set allows us to examine 
whether the estimation results are sensitive to the period under consideration, since the 
1990s period were characterised by increasing degrees of liberalisation of domestic financial 
markets compared to the 1980s
1.  Fourth, the paper utilises a variety of financial development 
and capital inflows measures, which purport to capture various aspects of financial deepening 
and capital mobility. Finally, besides using cross-country estimation methods, the paper also 
employs dynamic panel data analysis  - namely the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator - 
which has a number of econometric advantages compared to traditional panel data 
estimation.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the empirical model and 
econometric methodology. Section 3 explains the data employed in the analysis and Section 
4 reports and discusses the econometric results. Finally, Section 5 summarises and 
concludes.    
 
 
                                                 
1 Total private capital flows to developing countries increased more than sixfold to reach US$200 billion per year 
during 1995-97 from around US$30 billion per year during 1984-86 (World Bank, 1997).    5
2.0   The Empirical Model and Methodology 
 
The theoretical literature predicts financial development to be a positive function of 
real income and the real interest rate. This is based on McKinnon-Shaw type models and the 
endogenous growth literature. In the model of McKinnon (1973), the positive relationship 
between financial development and the level of output results from the complementarity 
between money and capital. It is assumed that investment is lumpy and self-financed and 
hence cannot be materialised unless adequate savings are accumulated in the form of bank 
deposits. In the model of Shaw (1973), financial markets, through debt intermediation, 
promote investment which, in turn, raises the level of output. A positive real interest rate, in 
these models, promotes financial development through the increased volume of financial 
saving mobilisation and stimulates growth through increasing the volume and productivity of 
capital. Higher real interest rates exert a positive effect on the average productivity of physical 
capital by discouraging investors from investing in low return projects (Fry, 1997). The 
endogenous growth literature also predicts a positive relationship between financial 
development, real income and the real interest rate (King and Levine, 1993a,b). Based on 
these theoretical postulates, a financial development relationship can be specified as:  
 
 FD  =  f(RGDPC,  R)         (1) 
 
where FD is financial development, RGDPC is the real GDP per capita, and R is the real 
interest rate.  
 
Recently, the role of institutions in influencing financial development has also 
received attention in the literature.  Arestis and Demetriades (1997) suggest that differences 
between finance-growth causal patterns may reflect institutional differences. Demetriades and 
Andrianova (2004) argue that the strength of institutions, such as financial regulation and the 
rule of law, may determine the success or failure of financial reforms. Chinn and Ito (2002) 
find that financial systems with a higher degree of legal/institutional development on average 
benefit more from financial liberalisation than those with a lower one.  
    
Therefore, Equation (1) is extended to incorporate institutions. Capital inflows and 
trade openness are also included in order to examine the possible separate influence of trade 
and capital account openness. Thus, the basic financial development equation is extended as 
follows:  
 
FD = f(RGDPC, R, INS, CIF, TO)            (2) 
   6
where INS is institutions, CIF is capital inflows and TO is trade openness. In order to examine 
directly the hypothesis proposed by Rajan and Zingales (2003) an interaction term between 
the last two variables is also included in the model as follows: 
 
 FD = f(RGDPC, R, INS, CIF, TO, CIFxTO)          (3) 
 
Equations (2) and (3) provide the basis for the empirical models that are estimated in this 
paper. 
  
Two econometrics methods are employed to estimate the two equations, namely (i) 
cross-country ordinary least squares (OLS), and (ii) dynamic panel data methods.  
 
 
Cross Country Analysis 
 
The pure cross-sectional, OLS analysis uses data averaged over 1980 – 2000, such 
that there is one observation per country. We focus on these time periods because we have 
complete data for the 43 developing countries over this period. In addition, the data of capital 
inflows for these economies are only available since the 1980s. The OLS regression takes the 
form:  
  
i i i i i i i TO CIF INS R RGDPC FD ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = ln ln ln ln ln 5 4 3 2 1 0     (4) 
 
where the dependent variable, FD is financial development indicator, RGDPC is real GDP per 
capita, R is the real interest rate (deflated by inflation), CIF is the capital inflows, TO is trade 
openness and  i ε is a random error. 
 
The model that includes the interaction term between capital inflows and trade 
openness is as follows: 
 
+ + + + + + = i i i i i i TO CIF INS R RGDPC FD ln ln ln ln ln 5 4 3 2 1 0 β β β β β β     (5) 
  i i CIFxTO ε β + ) ln( 6  
 
 
If  6 β  is found to be positive and statistically significant, then this implies that the combination 
of financial and trade openness exerts an influence on financial development, over and above 
any separate influence each of these two variables may independently have on financial 
development.  Thus,  6 β > 0 provides support to the Rajan and Zingales (2003) hypothesis. 
Three diagnostic checking tests are presented in order to check the robustness of cross-  7
sectional analysis, namely the Jarque-Bera normality test, the Breusch-Pagan 
heteroscedasticity test and the Ramsey RESET test of functional form.     
  
  Recent literature has discussed the possibility of bi-directional causal effect between 
financial development and economic growth (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Luintel and 
Khan, 1999). In econometric terms, what we need to address this problem is good 
instruments for economic performance that are uncorrelated with other plausible determinants 
of financial development. Therefore, two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable 
estimator is employed to control for potential endogeneity problems in estimating Equations 
(4) and (5). As shown in these equations, the real GDP per capita (RGDPC) and financial 
development (FD) might contain simultaneity bias, thus, we attempt to address this issue by 
using lagged income (Real GDP per capita in year 1965, RGDPC1965) as an instrumental 
variable
2 for RGDPC. The 2SLS estimations are carried out not only to correct endogeneity, 
but also to check the robustness of the findings.  
 
 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis 
 
While cross-sectional estimation methods may, in principle, capture the long-run 
relationship between the variables concerned, they do not take advantage of the time-series 
variation in the data, which could increase the efficiency of estimation. In addition, Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) point out that their theory can go some way in accounting for both the cross-
country differences in, and the time series variation of, financial development. It is, therefore, 
preferable to estimate Equations (2) and (3) using panel data techniques.  
 
The parameter estimate of both equations are obtained by employing recently 
developed methods for the statistically analysis of dynamic panel data, namely the pooled 
mean group (PMG) estimation proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999). This method is well suited 
to the analysis of dynamic panels that have both large time and cross-section data fields. In 
addition, this type of estimation has the advantage of being able to accommodate both the 
long run equilibrium and the possibly heterogeneous dynamic adjustment process.  
     
Following Pesaran et al. (1999), the unrestricted specification for the autoregressive 
distributed lag (ARDL) model for the dependent variable y is  
 



















it i j t i ij j t i ij t i i t i i it u x y x y y µ γ λ β φ                    (6)
                        i = 1,2, … N; t = 1,2, … T. 
 
                                                 
2 The initial income of year 1970 (RGDPC1970) is also used as an instrumental variable and the results are similar with 
year 1965.   8
where  it y is a scalar dependent variable,  it x is the k x 1 vector of regressors for group i, 
i µ represent the fixed effects,  i φ is a scalar coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, 
'
i β ’s is the k x 1 vector of coefficients on explanatory variables,  ij λ ’s are scalar coefficients on 
lagged first-differences of dependent variables, and  ij γ ’s are k x 1 coefficient vectors on first-
difference of explanatory variables and their lagged values. We assume that the disturbances 
it u ’s are independently distributed across i and t, with zero means and variances 
2
i σ > 0. 
Further assuming that  i φ < 0 for all i and therefore there exists a long-run relationship 
between  it y and  it x : 
 
it it i it x y η θ + =
'            i = 1,2, … N; t = 1,2, … T.                     (7) 
 
where  i i i φ β θ /
' ' − = is the k x 1 vector of the long-run coefficients, and  it η ’s are stationary with 
possibly non-zero means (including fixed effects). Since Equation (6) can be rewritten as 
 

















it i j t i ij j t i ij t i i it u x y y µ γ λ η φ                      (8) 
 
where  1 , − t i η is the error correction term given by (7), hence  i φ is the error correction coefficient 
measuring the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium.  
  
The Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999) restricts 
the long-run coefficients to be equal over the cross-section, but allows for the short-run 
coefficients and error variances to differ across groups on the cross-section; that is,  θ θ = i  for 
all i. The hypothesis of homogeneity of the long-run policy parameters cannot be assumed a 
priori and is tested empirically in all specifications by a Hausman-type test (Hausman, 1978). 
The group-specific short-run coefficients and the common long-run coefficients are computed 














































3.0 The  Data   9
 
The data set consists of a panel of observations for a group of developing countries 
for the period 1980 – 2000. Two groups of financial development indicator are employed in 
the analysis, namely banking sector development and capital market development. The three 
conventional variables to measure the banking sector development are liquid liabilities, 
private sector credit and domestic credit provided by banking sector, whereas the three 
variables to represent capital market development are stock market capitalisation, total share 
value traded and number of companies listed
3. All these financial development variables are 
expressed as ratios to GDP except the number of companies listed, which is divided by total 
population. The main sources of these annual data are the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank CD-ROM 2002) and Beck et al. (1999). The banking sector development 
indicators are employed in the cross-country estimation as well as the panel data analysis; 
whereas the capital market development indicators are only utilised in the panel data analysis 
due to these indicators are only available for 22 developing countries.  
 
Annual data on real GDP per capita and real deposit interest rate (deflated by 
inflation) are obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank CD-ROM 2002) 
and International Financial Statistics (IFS). The real GDP per capita is converted to US dollars 
based on 1995 constant prices.  
 
The institutions data set employed in this study was assembled by the IRIS Center of 
the University Maryland from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) – a monthly 
publication of Political Risk Services (PRS). Following Knack and Keefer (1995), five PRS 
indicators are used to measure the overall institutional environment, namely: (i) Corruption (ii) 
Rule of Law (iii) Bureaucratic Quality (iv) Government Repudiation of Contracts and (v) Risk 
of Expropriation. The above first three variables are scaled from 0 to 6, whereas the last two 
variables are scaled from 0 to 10. Higher values imply better institutional quality and vice 
versa. The institutions indicator is obtained by summing the above five indicators
4.  
 
Three capital inflows proxies are employed to assess whether capital inflows have 
any impact on financial development, namely private capital inflows, inflows of capital and 
capital account liberalisation indicator constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002)
5. The former two 
indicators are obtained from the World Development Indicators. Among these three proxies, 
the capital account liberalisation indicator is employed solely in the cross country analysis due 
to this data set has no variation over time for most of the developing countries, which 
                                                 
3 The sample period of the number of companies listed is only covering from 1988 – 2000. 
4 The scale of corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule of law was first converted to 0 to 10 (multiplying them by 5/3) 
to make them comparable to the other indicators. For robustness checks, we also used different weights for each 
indicator to construct the aggregate index. The estimates are similar and are available on request.  
 
5 The index on capital account openness from Chinn and Ito (2002) is based on the four binary dummy variables 
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These 
variables are to provide information on the extent and nature of the restrictions on external accounts for a wide cross-
section of countries.    10
indicates that the sample developing countries do not embark on programs of capital account 
liberalisation; whereas the inflows of capital indicator, which is obtained from the International 
Financial statistics (IFS) is only employed in the panel data analysis because of the data set 
is available for 16 countries. Nevertheless, the private capital inflows indicator is employed in 
both cross-country estimation and panel data analysis,  
 
The following two trade openness proxies are employed in the analysis: total trade as 
a ratio of GDP and import duties as a ratio of total imports (ID); both are available from World 
Development Indicators. Due to the import duties indicator is only available for 15 developing 
countries, this variable is employed in the panel data analysis. Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
suggest that openness fosters financial development. Therefore, higher import duties would 
discourage financial development or there is a negative relationship between both variables. 
As such, the import duties indicator was first converted to (1 – ID/100) in order to have 
consistent positive relationship with trade openness. In other words, the inverse import duties 
indicator measures trade openness or low trade barriers, thus the interaction term between 
capital inflows and trade openness can be quantified since this term has positive impact on 
financial development as highlighted in the theory. 
 
The definitions of the financial development, capital inflows and trade openness 
indicators above data are presented in Table AI (see Appendix I).  
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics results of banking sector development 
indicators (N = 43), capital market development indicators (N = 22) and other variables that 
employed in the analysis, where the sample period is covering from 1980 – 2000. The list of 
these countries is presented in Table AII and Table AIII (See Appendix II). There is 
considerable variation among these variables especially the financial development indicators, 
real GDP per capita and institutions. Malaysia, one of the developing countries in this group, 
has the highest private sector credit, domestic credit, market capitalisation, total share value 
traded, number of companies listed, trade openness and institutions, whereas it ranks second 
highest in terms of liquid liabilities (after Jordan) and capital inflows (after Chile). These 
observations indicate that capital inflows and trade openness may be positively correlated 
with financial development. Table 2 reports the correlation results and this table reveals that 
capital inflows and trade openness are indeed positively correlated with the financial 
development indicators. For example, the private capital inflows and trade openness have the 





4.0 Estimation  Results 
   11
OLS Cross-Country Results 
 
We first estimate equations (4) and (5) on the full sample and two sub-samples on 
averaged annual data for the 43 developing countries using the OLS cross-country estimator. 
Two capital inflows proxies are employed namely private capital inflows and capital account 
liberalisation. The results are reported in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. Models 1 – 3 are 
estimates of Equation (4), utilising alternative proxies for financial development, where 
Models 4 – 6 are estimates of Equation (5), which includes the interaction term between 
capital inflows and trade openness.  
 
To start with, it is important to note that the signs of the estimated coefficients on real 
GDP per capita and the real interest rate are consistent with theory. As shown in Table 3 and 
Table 4, both variables have a positive relationship with financial development, in all models. 
It is worth noting that the Jarque-Bera statistic suggests that the residuals of the regressions 
are normally distributed in all models. The Breusch-Pagan heteroscedasticity test indicates 
that the residuals are homoskedastic and independent of the regressors in all models. The 
Ramsey RESET test reveals that there is no mis-specification error, again, in all models. 
Thus, the diagnostic checking results suggests that the models are relatively well specified.    
 
Examining first Models 1 – 3 in Table 3, where private capital inflows is the proxy for 
capital account openness and the interaction term is absent, the results reveal that real GDP 
per capita is a statistically significant determinant of financial development when the full 
sample is utilised. This continues to be the case in Models 1 and 2 in both sub-samples, but 
not so in Model 3 (where the financial indicator is domestic credit) where it is significant only 
at the 10% level. This result seems to demonstrate that economic performance matters for 
financial development. Interestingly, the real interest rate is insignificant in all the 
specifications, a result which is in line with previous findings by Demetriades and Luintel 
(1997) and Arestis and Demetriades (1997). The institutions variable is statistically significant 
only in sub-sample period II, which may indicate that institutions began to influence financial 
development in the 1990s. The impact of capital inflows is also more apparent in the second 
sub-sample, while the trade openness variable is not significant at conventional levels.  
 
In Models 4 – 6 which include the interaction term, real GDP per capita continues to 
enter as a positive and significant determinant of financial development, except perhaps in 
Model 6 in Sub-Sample Period II, where it is significant only at the 10% level. The real interest 
rate remains insignificant throughout and the institutional quality proxy is, once again, 
significant only in the 1990’s period. Trade openness is, if anything, even less significant in 
these regressions. Interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant in all the specifications in sub-sample period II and in one of the   12
specifications in the full sample (Model 1). These findings provide limited support to the Rajan 
and Zingales hypothesis, in that they are only robust for the 1990’s.      
 
Table 4 repeats the analysis using, however, the capital account liberalisation 
indicator constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002) as a proxy for capital inflows. The results are 
broadly similar to those reported in Table 3.  The only notable difference is that the interaction 
term appears significant in two out of three cases when the full sample is utilised and the 
same is also true of sub-sample period II.  It is clearly the case that the interaction terms 
works better in explaining the variation of financial development across countries than either 
of its separate constituents.  
 
 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Results 
  
  The 2SLS results are reported in Tables 5 and 6.  Table 5 utilises private capital 
inflows as a proxy for capital account openness and we discuss those results first. The first-
stage regression results indicate that initial income is a statistically significant determinant of 
real GDP per capita (RGDP). This implies that RGDP in year 1965 is a valid instrument in the 
analysis
6. As shown in this table, the results are similar to the OLS results reported in Table 3. 
With just one exception, real GDP per capita remains a statistically significant determinant of 
financial development in both the full sample and the two sub-samples in all specifications; 
the exception is Model 1 in the full sample, where it is only significant at the 10% level. The 
real interest rate remains insignificant throughout. The impact of institutions on financial 
development remains more apparent during the 1990s. The coefficients on the interaction 
term are similar to those obtained with the OLS regression, and they are larger than those on 
capital inflows and trade liberalization. The Hausman test results reveal that the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, which indicates that there is no difference between the estimates 
from OLS and 2SLS instrumental variable, and real GDP per capita can be treated as 
exogenous. This finding also strengthens the argument that the interaction between capital 
inflows and trade openness is positive and statistically significant, highlighting that capital and 
trade openness has larger effects on financial development. Overall, the 2SLS results 
demonstrate that the OLS results are robust since both estimations indicate similar findings. 
  
Table 6 reports the 2SLS when the capital account liberalization is employed as a 
proxy for capital inflows. Again, the Hausman test results indicate that there is no different 
between the estimates from OLS and 2SLS instrumental variable. The results are similar to 
that obtained with the OLS regression, with the only notable difference being that the 
interaction terms is statistically significant in all except two specifications.  The exceptions are 
Model 2 in the full sample and the first sub-sample; note however, that in the full sample it is 
                                                 
6 These results, however, are not reported but available upon request.   13
significant at the 10% level, probably reflecting the strength of the relationship in the 1990s.  





Pooled Mean Group Estimations Results 
 
  Table 7 reports estimates of Models (2) and (3) that utilize the pooled mean group 
estimator, which imposes common long-run effects. This table presents estimates of the long-
run coefficients, the adjustment coefficients and Hausman test statistics. The lag order is first 
chosen in each country on the unrestricted model by the Akaike information criterion (AIC), 
subject to a maximum lag of 1. Then, using these AIC-determined lag orders, homogeneity is 
imposed. The results indicate that the joint Hausman test statistic fails to reject the null 
hypothesis and this reveals that the data do not reject the restriction of common long-run 
coefficients. Besides, the Hausman test also indicates that the pooling restrictions cannot be 
rejected for five independent variables. The coefficients of real GDP per capita and 
institutions are positive and statistically significant throughout. The private capital inflows 
variable also enters significantly in Models 2 and 3. On the other hand, in Models 4 –6 when 
the interaction term is included in the model, the capital inflows variable loses significance at 
conventional levels. Note, however, that the interaction term enters with a large and highly 
significant positive coefficient in Models 4 – 6. These results, therefore, provide strong 
support for the Rajan-Zingales hypothesis. The joint Hausman test of these models also 
indicates that the data do not reject the restriction of common long-run coefficients, but the 
poolability of real interest rate coefficient is rejected.  
 
Table 8 repeats the pooled mean group estimator analysis with three capital market 
development indicators, namely stock market capitalization, total share value traded and 
number of companies listed. These indicators are only available for 22 developing countries
7 
and the sample period spans the period 1980 – 2000, except for the number of companies 
listed, for which data is only available for the period 1988 – 2000. Both the real GDP per 
capita and real interest rate retain their positive sign, but only real GDP per capita is 
statistically significant in all models. The institutional quality variable is statistically significant 
in determining market capitalization and total share value traded, but is significant only at the 
10% in the regression that explains total number of companies listed. The capital inflows 
variable is a statistically significant determinant of stock market capitalization and total share 
value traded. In contrast, trade openness has a significant influence on market capitalization 
and number of companies listed. In Models 4 – 6, the interaction term is statistically significant 
at the 1% level in two out of three models and significant at the 10% level in the third. 
                                                 
7 The cross-country analysis is not conducted for these capital market development indicators - stock market 
capitalisation, total share value traded and number of companies listed due to small sample size (N = 22).   14
Interestingly, trade openness and capital inflows each have an independent statistically 
significant influence in two out of three specifications.  These findings suggest that the Rajan-
Zingales hypothesis applies not only to the development of the banking system, but also to 
the development of the capital market.  
 
Table 9 repeats the analysis carried out in Table 7, using a different capital inflows 
proxy, namely inflows of capital that consists of foreign direct investment and portfolio 
investment
8. This variable is only available for 16 developing countries. The lag order of AIC 
is restricted to a maximum lag of 1 and the Hausman test statistic fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of common long-run coefficients.  Real GDP per capita and institutions retain their 
positive sign and are both statistically significant. The inflows of capital is significant at the 
10% level in Models 2 and 3. The estimated coefficients of the interaction term in Model 4 – 6 
are both large and highly significant. These findings suggest that the results obtained in Table 
7 are robust to changes in the measurement of capital account openness. 
  
Table 10 repeats the analysis of Table 8 with the alternative proxy for capital inflows. 
Again, real GDP per capita remains statistically significant in all specifications, while 
institutional quality is now significant in all but one models (the exception being Model 6 
where it is significant at the 10% level). Interestingly, the new capital inflows proxy, which 
consists of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, is positive and highly significant 
in all specifications. In addition, the interaction term is highly significant in all three models. 
These findings suggest that support for the Rajan-Zingales hypothesis is, if anything, even 
stronger when the alternative proxy for capital account openness is utilised.  
 
The estimated pooled mean group results when import duties indicator
9 is employed 
as an alternative proxy for trade openness are reported in Table 11. This indicator is found to 
be statistically insignificant while real GDP per capita, institutions and capital inflows are 
statistically significant in all models. However, models containing the interaction term 
demonstrate that the interaction between capital inflows and import duties has a positive and 
highly significant influence on financial development. Table 12 reports the analysis of Table 
11 with the alternative proxy for financial development, namely capital market development 
indicators. The import duties and institutions are statistically significant for three models, 
whereas real GDP per capita and capital inflows are significant in two out of three models. 
Again, the estimated coefficients of the interaction term are both large and significant in 
Models 4 and 6. Thus, the main finding of our paper, namely that the trade openness has an 
independent influence on financial development is robust to changes in the measurement of 
both capital and trade account openness.  
                                                 
8 The capital account liberalization proxy constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002) is not employed in the panel data 
analysis even though the data is available from 1977 - 1999. This indicator is computed using the principal 
component analysis and most of the countries have no variation of capital account liberalization measurement 
throughout the year except in the mid 1990s.  





The evidence presented utilising cross-country regressions and panel data analysis in 
a group of developing countries, provides varying degrees of support to the Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) hypothesis – that simultaneous opening of both the capital and trade 
accounts will promote financial development. The evidence is at its strongest when we utilise 
dynamic panel estimation techniques, and is robust to alternative measures of both trade 
account and capital account openness.  The evidence remains valid for a variety of financial 
development indicators, including 3 indicators of banking system development and 3 
indicators of capital market development.   
 
Our findings also suggest that among the conventional determinants of financial 
development real GDP per capita is the most robust one, while as suspected by several 
authors in the past, the influence of the real interest rate is, at best, very weak and statistically 
insignificant. We also find that institutional quality is a robust and statistically significant 
determinant of financial development, providing support to the case made by Arestis and 
Demetriades (1997, 1999).  There is also some evidence to suggest that capital inflows have 
an independent positive influence on financial development, independently of their influence 
through the interaction term, especially so in the case of capital market development. Finally, 
trade openness is not found to have a separate independent influence on financial 
development, irrespective of which measure is employed. In terms of policy implications, our 
findings suggest that simultaneously stimulating foreign capital inflows and trade openness, 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
N = 43  LL  PRI  DOC  RGDPC  R  INS  CIF  TO   18
Mean 40.62  31.25  45.44  1812.94 -2.00  27.18  2.47  62.61 
Std Dev  20.17  19.55  25.18  1810.59 5.94 4.79 1.77  26.52 
Maximum 102.06 91.80  109.33  7723.25 8.21  36.06 7.70  144.56 
Minimum 14.88  3.83  -32.27  153.27 -20.50  18.53  0.18  16.89 
 
N = 22  MC  VT  NC  RGDPC  R  INS  CIF  TL 
Mean 21.95  9.08  0.00093  2215.59 -0.43  28.75  2.79  66.21 
Std Dev  26.39  14.42  0.00087  1940.39 5.07 4.26 1.81  29.43 
Maximum 121.87 54.80  0.00296  8082.44 7.31  36.95 7.53  149.14 
Minimum 0.79  0.04  0.00010  250.94 -13.97  20.43  0.58  19.57 
Note: LL = Liquid Liabilities/GDP; PRI = Private Sector Credit/GDP; DOC = Domestic Credit/GDP; RGDPC = Real 
GDP Per Capita; R = Real Interest Rate; INS = Institutions; CIF = Private Capital Flows; TO = Trade Openness; MC 






Table 2: Correlation Results 
 
N = 43  LL  PRI  DOC  RGDPC  R  INS  CIF  TO 
LL  1.00        
PRI  0.70  1.00       
DOC 0.89  0.74  1.00      
RGDPC 0.37  0.55  0.46  1.00     
R  -0.07 0.07 0.12 0.31 1.00       
INS 0.26  0.37  0.35  0.46 0.34 1.00     
CIF  0.23 0.42 0.29 0.51 0.05 0.28 1.00   
TO  0.36 0.23 0.13 0.10 0.45 0.04 0.07 1.00 
 
N = 22  MC  VT  NC  RGDPC  R  INS  CIF  TO 
MC  1.00         
VT  0.72  1.00        
NC  0.46  0.10  1.00       
RGDPC 0.21  0.49  0.42  1.00      
R  0.37 0.27 0.17 0.11 1.00       
INS 0.53  0.64  0.53  0.63 0.43 1.00     
CIF  0.76 0.40 0.47 0.30 0.21 0.51 1.00   
TO  0.74 0.43 0.60 0.10 0.25 0.27 0.54 1.00 
Note: LL = Liquid Liabilities/GDP; PRI = Private Sector Credit/GDP; DOC = Domestic Credit/GDP; RGDPC = Real 
GDP Per Capita; R = Real Interest Rate; INS = Institutions; CIF = Private Capital Flows; TO = Trade Openness; MC 
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Table 3: Results of OLS Regressions 
(Dependent Variable: Financial Development) 
Openness Proxy: Total Trade/GDP   
Capital Inflows Proxy: Private Capital Flows 
  Full Sample Period: 1980 – 2000  Sub-Sample Period I: 1980 - 1989  Sub-Sample Period II: 1990 – 2000 
  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable 
  LL  PRI DOC  LL  PRI DOC  LL  PRI DOC 
  Without Interaction Term 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant  0.88 (0.67)  -0.04 (-0.02)  0.55 (0.39)  1.43 (1.26)  -0.42 (-0.29)  1.59 (1.29)  -2.31 (-1.45)  -3.34 (-1.52)  -1.72 (-0.84) 
RGDPC 0.16  (2.07)**
  0.26 (2.37)**
  0.17 (2.05)**
  0.13 (2.22)**
  0.23 (2.06)**
  0.17 (1.89)*
  0.20 (2.06)**
  0.28 (2.29)**
  0.19 (1.70)*
 
R  0.01 (0.17)  0.01 (0.18)  0.01 (0.19)  0.02 (0.62)  0.01 (0.20) 0.02  (0.69) 0.02 (0.52)  0.06 (0.98) 0.05  (1.03) 
INS  0.06 (0.15)  0.07 (0.14)  0.38 (0.85)  0.07 (0.25)  0.33 (0.91)  0.09 (0.32)  0.40 (2.04)**
  0.35 (2.22)**  0.36 (2.13)** 
CIF  -0.01 (-0.09)  0.11 (0.87) 0.03  (0.26) -0.01  (-0.13)  0.11 (0.79)  0.04 (0.39)  0.14 (2.05)**  0.22 (2.16)**
  0.11 (1.90)* 
TO 0.32  (2.02)*
  0.28 (1.37)  0.18 (1.06) 0.35  (2.02)*
  0.24 (1.06)  0.18 (1.00) 0.36  (1.75)*
  0.41 (1.86)*
  0.22 (1.12) 
Adj R
2  0.28   0.36 0.30 0.24 0.37 0.21 0.42 0.48 0.33 
Normality  1.52 (0.46)  6.20 (0.06) *  2.41 (0.29)  2.95 (0.23)  0.73 (0.69)  0.04 (0.98) 1.90  (0.38) 4.26  (0.11) 5.15  (0.07)* 
B-P   0.45 (0.50)  0.06 (0.81)  0.03 (0.86)  0.27 (0.60) 0.38  (0.53) 0.19  (0.66) 0.12  (0.72) 0.04  (0.83) 0.16  (0.68) 
Ramsey  2.10 (0.12)  1.71 (0.18) 0.55  (0.65) 2.27  (0.10) 1.34  (0.27) 1.39  (0.26) 0.84  (0.48) 1.36  (0.27) 0.60  (0.61) 
            
  With Interaction Term 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Constant  2.53 (1.86)  0.97 (0.51) 1.64  (1.08) 2.14  (1.73)  -1.56 (-0.99)  1.74 (1.29)  -1.97 (-1.23)  -3.18 (-1.41)  -0.86 (-0.42) 
RGDPC 0.22  (2.73)**
  0.29 (2.60)**
  0.21 (2.37)**
  0.16 (2.14)**
  0.18 (2.26)**
  0.17 (2.18)**
  0.19 (2.09)**
  0.21 (2.38)**
  0.18 (1.79)*
 
R  0.02 (0.46)  0.03 (0.46)  0.03 (0.59)  0.03 (0.87)  0.01 (0.11) 0.02  (0.73) 0.03 (0.66)  0.06 (1.01) 0.07  (1.27) 
INS  0.08 (0.21)  0.02 (0.03)  0.29 (0.65)  0.16 (0.56)  0.48 (1.30)  0.07 (0.25)  0.46 (2.22)**
  0.39 (2.27)**  0.37 (2.14)**
 
CIF -0.18  (-1.85)*
  -0.22 (-1.11)  -0.43 (-1.67) -0.27  (-1.36)
  -0.25 (1.80)*
  -0.28 (-0.36)  -0.24 (-1.25)
  -0.22 (-1.20)
  -0.20 (-1.91)*
 
TO  0.02 (0.14)  0.07 (0.25) 0.06  (0.29) 0.19  (0.91) 0.39  (1.86)*
  0.14 (0.65)  0.14 (0.61) 0.32  (0.94)
  0.19 (0.65) 
CIF x TO  0.50 (2.76)***
  0.31 (1.22)  0.34 (1.72)*
  0.24 (1.76)*
  0.50 (1.70)*
  0.06 (0.30)
  0.42 (2.26)**
  0.40 (2.41)**
  0.41 (2.18)**
 
Adj R
2  0.42   0.38   0.36   0.29   0.43 0.22 0.46 0.51 0.40   
Normality  1.86 (0.39)  5.21 (0.07)*  0.00 (0.99)  0.89 (0.64)  1.83 (0.40)  0.84 (0.65)  0.99 (0.61)  3.85 (0.15)  2.28 (0.32) 
B-P   0.01 (0.92)  0.19 (0.67)  0.00 (0.97)  0.11 (0.73) 2.45  (0.12) 0.11  (0.74) 0.05  (0.82) 0.00  (0.98) 0.10  (0.29) 
Ramsey  0.11 (0.95)  0.27 (0.84) 0.33  (0.80) 2.14  (0.12) 2.09  (0.12) 0.63  (0.60) 0.71  (0.55) 1.25  (0.31) 0.28  (0.84) 
N  43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are the t-statistics except for the normality test, Breausch-Pagan heteroscedasticity test and Ramsey RESET tests, which are p-value. ***, ** and * denote 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
   20
 
Table 4: Results of OLS Regressions 
(Dependent Variable: Financial Development) 
Openness Proxy: Total Trade/GDP  
Capital Inflows Proxy: Capital Account Liberalisation (Chinn and Ito, 2002)  
  Full Sample Period: 1980 – 1999  Sub-Sample Period I: 1980 - 1989  Sub-Sample Period II: 1990 – 1999 
  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable 
  LL  PRI DOC  LL  PRI DOC  LL  PRI DOC 
  Without Interaction Term 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant  0.24 (0.19)  -1.21 (-0.69)  0.14 (0.11)  0.97 (1.04)  -0.97 (-0.74)  1.10 (1.12)  -2.34 (-1.52)  -4.45 (-2.02)  -1.01 (-0.54) 
RGDPC 0.21  (2.67)**
  0.32 (2.95)***
  0.22 (2.85)***
  0.17 (2.32)**
  0.30 (3.05)***
  0.20 (2.74)***
  0.18 (2.04)**
  0.31 (2.47)**
  0.24 (2.04)**
 
R  0.02 (0.45)  0.01 (0.13)  0.01 (0.19)  0.01 (0.40)  0.02 (0.43) 0.01  (0.37) 0.02 (0.49)  0.07 (1.18) 0.03  (0.58) 
INS  0.11 (0.27)  0.28 (0.48)  0.35 (0.81)  0.04 (0.14)  0.22 (0.63)  0.12 (0.46)  0.31 (2.19)**
  0.42 (2.27)**  0.57 (1.83)* 
CIF  -0.09 (-1.13)  0.05 (0.47)  -0.13 (-1.68)  -0.09 (-1.24)  0.05 (0.49)  -0.16 (1.79)*
  0.11 (2.09)**  0.17 (2.15)**
  0.14 (1.53) 
TO 0.36  (2.25)**
  0.31 (1.40)  0.21 (1.33) 0.37  (2.24)**
  0.35 (1.76)*
  0.21 (1.45)  0.37 (2.26)**
  0.44 (1.88)*
  0.25 (1.25) 
Adj R
2  0.32   0.37 0.33 0.28 0.36 0.29 0.53 0.50 0.35 
Normality  1.50 (0.47)  5.29 (0.07) 1.83  (0.40) 3.21  (0.20) 2.30  (0.32) 0.52  (0.77) 1.78  (0.41) 2.68 (0.26)  0.18 (0.91) 
B-P   0.06 (0.80)  0.42 (0.52)  0.00 (0.95)  0.25 (0.62) 2.57  (0.11) 0.00  (0.96) 0.14  (0.71) 0.02  (0.89) 3.68  (0.05) 
Ramsey  1.96 (0.14)  1.62 (0.20) 0.93  (0.43) 2.41  (0.08) 1.49  (0.23) 1.96  (0.14) 0.77  (0.52) 1.98  (0.13) 0.62  (0.61) 
            
  With Interaction Term 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Constant 0.52  (0.43)  -0.92 (-0.53)  0.54 (0.44)
  0.50 (0.51)  -1.11 (-0.78)  0.57 (0.57)  -1.65 (-1.02)  -4.25 (-1.79)  -0.51 (-0.25) 
RGDPC 0.24  (3.19)***
  0.35 (3.24)***
  0.26 (3.50)***
  0.17 (2.47)**
  0.31 (3.02)***
  0.21 (2.92)***
  0.22 (2.42)**
  0.32 (2.37)**
  0.24 (2.15)**
 
R  0.05 (1.06)  0.02 (0.30)  0.04 (0.90)  0.01 (0.36)  0.02 (0.42) 0.01  (0.34) 0.03 (-0.50)  0.06 (0.67) 0.01  (0.09) 
INS  0.16 (0.38)  0.01 (0.01)  0.02 (0.04)  0.13 (0.51)  0.20 (0.53)  0.02 (0.05)  0.26 (2.15)**
  0.34 (2.31)**  0.41 (1.56)
 
CIF -0.28  (-2.23)**
  -0.23 (-1.39)  -0.60 (-1.66) -0.24  (-1.54)
  -0.19 (-0.22)
  -0.08 (-1.78)*
  -0.16 (-1.27)
  -0.22 (-0.20)
  -0.23 (-0.89)
 
TO 0.32  (2.10)**
  0.40 (1.74)*
  0.30 (1.97)*
  0.54 (2.93)***
  0.39 (1.49)
  0.23 (1.54)  0.22 (1.27)
  0.26 (0.64)
  0.21 (1.00) 
CIF x TO  0.45 (2.80)***
  0.31 (1.46)  0.36 (2.45)**
  0.21 (1.40)
  0.51 (1.78)*
  0.39 (2.12)**
  0.35 (2.46)**
  0.42 (2.28)**
  0.32 (1.74)*
 
Adj R
2  0.40   0.41   0.33   0.32   0.36 0.34 0.43 0.45 0.35   
Normality  1.33 (0.51)  5.41 (0.07)  0.44 (0.80)  2.87 (0.23) 9.43  (0.01)**
  2.29 (0.31)  1.54 (0.46)  2.63 (0.26)  0.09 (0.95) 
B-P   0.21 (0.64)  0.85 (0.35)  0.18 (0.67)  0.25 (0.62) 2.68  (0.10) 0.01  (0.91) 0.25  (0.62) 0.02  (0.88) 3.24  (0.07) 
Ramsey  0.09 (0.96)  0.33 (0.80) 1.16  (0.34) 5.10  (0.01)**
  1.80 (0.17)  0.40 (0.75) 0.63  (0.59) 2.01  (0.13) 0.67  (0.57) 
N  43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are the t-statistics except for the normality test, Breausch-Pagan (B-P) heteroscedasticity test and Ramsey RESET tests, which are p-value. ***, ** and * denote 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   21
Table 5: Results of Instrumental 2SLS Regressions 
(Dependent Variable: Financial Development) 
Openness Proxy: Total Trade/GDP  
Capital Inflows Proxy: Private Capital Inflows/GDP  
  Full Sample Period: 1980 – 2000  Sub-Sample Period I: 1980 - 1989  Sub-Sample Period II: 1990 – 2000 
  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable 
  LL  PRI DOC  LL  PRI DOC  LL  PRI DOC 
  Without Interaction Term 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant  1.03 (0.77)  0.04 (0.02) 0.81  (0.56)  1.64  (1.40)  -0.59 (-0.39)  2.03 (1.60)  -2.76 (-1.68)  -4.04 (-1.78)*
  -2.28 (-1.07) 
RGDPC 0.18  (1.81)*
  0.21 (2.36)**
  0.19 (1.99)**
  0.11 (2.13)**
  0.25 (2.04)**
  0.11 (2.09)**
  0.17 (2.16)**
  0.19 (2.37)**
  0.14 (2.03)**
 
R  -0.01 (-0.02)  0.01 (0.25)  0.02 (0.42)  0.02 (0.66) 0.01  (0.18) 0.02  (0.76) 0.02  (0.53) 0.06  (0.98) 0.06  (1.01) 
INS  0.21 (0.47)  0.15 (0.28)  0.60 (1.29)  0.06 (0.19)  0.32 (0.87)  0.13 (0.42)  0.46 (2.42)**
  0.51 (1.80)*
  0.55 (2.06)**
 
CIF  -0.04 (-0.37)  0.14 (1.03)  0.10 (0.94)  -0.01 (-0.03)  0.09 (0.67)  0.01 (0.08)  0.13 (2.26)**  0.25 (2.15)**
  0.04 (0.29) 
TO 0.31  (1.90)*
  0.28 (1.33)  0.15 (0.88) 0.33  (1.91)*
  0.25 (1.10)  0.15 (0.81) 0.34  (2.03)**
  0.37 (1.61)  0.16 (0.74) 
            
Hausman 
Test 
2.62 (0.85)  0.56 (0.99)  6.66 (0.35)  0.54 (0.99) 0.20  (0.99) 2.55  (0.86) 2.69  (0.84) 3.44  (0.75) 6.52  (0.36) 
            
  With Interaction Term 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Constant  2.53 (1.84)  0.97 (0.51)  1.65 (1.06)  2.28 (1.81)  -1.65 (-1.02)  2.09 (1.52)  -2.35 (-1.43)  -3.86 (-1.66)  -1.28 (-0.61) 
RGDPC 0.16  (2.67)**
  0.25 (2.19)**
  0.20 (2.40)**
  0.14 (2.09)**
  0.17 (2.23)**
  0.11 (2.10)**
  0.15 (2.06)**
  0.16 (2.23)**
  0.14 (2.18)**
 
R  0.02 (0.53)  0.03 (0.49)  0.03 (0.70)  0.03 (0.89)  0.01 (0.12) 0.02  (0.76) 0.03 (0.67)  0.06 (1.01) 0.07  (1.26) 
INS  0.04 (0.06)  0.04 (0.08)  0.50 (1.10)  0.15 (0.49)  0.47 (1.26)  0.12 (0.38)  0.57 (2.57)**
  0.56 (1.80)*
  0.70 (2.32)**
 
CIF -0.17  (-2.48)**
  -0.13 (-1.01)  -0.37 (-1.20) -0.21  (-1.25)
  -0.20 (-1.74)*
  -0.11 (-0.14)  -0.17 (-1.19)
  -0.15 (-0.14)
  -0.18 (-1.92)*
 
TO  0.02 (0.07)  0.07 (0.27) 0.05  (0.26)  0.18  (0.88) 0.38  (1.87)*
  0.13 (0.59)  0.13 (0.51) 0.28  (0.81)
  0.25 (0.84) 
CIF x TO  0.47 (2.54)***
  0.29 (1.14)  0.27 (1.85)*
  0.23 (1.28)
  0.50 (2.01)*
  0.26 (0.13)
  0.43 (2.23)**
  0.39 (2.38)**  0.42 (2.19)**
 
            
Hausman 
Test 
1.43 (0.98)  2.35 (0.93)  5.72 (0.57)  0.38 (0.99) 5.72  (0.57) 2.49  (0.92) 2.06  (0.95) 3.24  (0.86) 5.25  (0.63) 
N 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   22
Table 6: Results of Instrumental 2SLS Regressions 
(Dependent Variable: Financial Development) 
Openness Proxy: Total Trade/GDP  
Capital Inflows Proxy: Capital Account Liberalisation (Chinn and Ito, 2002)  
 
  Full Sample Period: 1980 - 1999  Sub-Sample Period I: 1980 – 1989  Sub-Sample Period II: 1990 – 1999 
  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable  Dependent Variable 
  LL  PRI DOC  LL  PRI DOC  LL  PRI DOC 
  Without Interaction Term 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant 0.27  (0.22)  -1.19  (-0.67)  0.23 (0.17)  1.13 (1.18)  -1.06 (-0.79)  1.39 (1.39)  -2.89 (-1.81)  -5.04 (-2.21)
  -2.08 (-1.05) 
RGDPC 0.18  (2.49)**
  0.28 (2.26)**
  0.22 (2.15)**
  0.14 (2.17)**
  0.32 (2.93)***
  0.18 (2.21)**
  0.21 (2.03)**
  0.27 (2.38)**
  0.18 (2.18)**
 
R  0.01 (-0.26)  0.01 (0.20)  0.01 (0.11)  0.01 (0.49)  0.02 (0.39) 0.02  (0.53) 0.03 (0.63)  0.08 (1.28) 0.05  (0.81) 
INS  0.28 (0.65)  0.37 (0.61)  0.60 (1.36)  0.10 (0.08)  0.42 (0.60)  0.14 (0.54)  0.40 (2.37)**
  0.46 (2.28)**
  0.42 (1.84)*
 
CIF  -0.06 (-0.76)  0.07 (0.59)  -0.09 (-1.08)  -0.08 (-1.14)  0.05 (0.45)  -0.14 (-1.91)*
  0.03 (0.38)  0.11 (0.89)
  0.06 (0.64) 
TO 0.35  (2.13)**
  0.31 (1.36)  0.19 (1.14) 0.37  (2.63)**
  0.35 (1.76)*
  0.20 (1.42)  0.33 (1.99)*
  0.40 (1.69)*
  0.17 (0.82) 
            
Hausman 
Test 
2.76 (0.83)  0.44 (0.99)  7.43 (0.28)  0.76 (0.99) 0.26  (0.99) 2.94  (0.82) 2.35  (0.88) 1.34  (0.96) 7.26  (0.29) 
            
  With Interaction Term 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Constant  0.53 (0.43)  -0.92 (-0.53)  0.57 (0.45)  0.64 (0.64)  -1.21 (-0.84)  0.85 (0.82)  -2.35 (-1.43)  -3.86 (-1.66)  -1.28 (-0.61) 
RGDPC 0.17  (1.97)*
  0.32 (2.56)**
  0.25 (2.35)**
  0.18 (1.96)*
  0.33 (2.92)***
  0.16 (2.13)**
  0.02 (2.15)**
  0.16 (2.23)**
  0.14 (2.18)**
 
R  -0.04 (-0.83)  -0.01 (-0.23)  -0.02 (-0.52)  0.01 (0.44)  0.02 (0.38)  0.01 (0.48)  0.03 (0.67)  0.06 (1.01)  0.07 (1.26) 
INS  0.02 (0.03)  0.09 (0.14)  0.29 (0.66)  0.12 (0.45)  0.19 (0.50)  0.04 (0.15)  0.57 (2.57)**
  0.56 (1.98)**
  0.70 (2.32)**
 
CIF -0.24  (-1.96)*
  -0.16 (-1.29)  -0.37 (-2.19)**
  -0.19 (-1.50)
  -0.21 (-0.24)
  -0.14 (-1.69)*
  -0.17 (-1.19)
  -0.15 (-0.14)
  -0.18 (-1.92)*
 
TO 0.28  (1.87)*
  0.30 (1.38)  0.27 (1.69)*
  0.21 (1.37)
  0.20 (1.30)
  0.22 (1.47)  0.13 (0.51) 0.28  (0.81)
  0.25 (0.84) 
CIF x TO  0.42 (2.63)***
  0.39 (1.69)*
  0.31 (2.06)**
  0.44 (2.90)***
  0.40 (1.50)
  0.39 (2.06)**
  0.43 (2.23)**
  0.39 (2.38)**  0.42 (2.19)**
 
            
Hausman 
Test 
2.32 (0.94)  0.26 (0.99)  6.75 (0.45)  0.55 (0.99) 0.46  (0.99) 2.54  (0.92) 2.06  (0.95) 3.24  (0.86) 5.25  (0.63) 
N 43 43  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Notes: Figures in the parentheses are the t-statistics. ***, ** and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL 
Dependent Variable: Financial Development (Banking Sector Development) 
Openness Proxy: Total Trade/GDP  
Capital Inflows Proxy: Private Capital Flows 
 Liquid 
Liabilities 
  Private 
Sector 
Credit 





Model 1  Hausman 
Test 
Model 2  Hausman 
Test 
Model 3  Hausman 
Test 


































































Adjustment -0.16   
(-5.67)***
 
 -0.16   
(-5.32)***
 
















      
   
With Interaction 
Term 
Model 4  Hausman 
Test 
Model 5  Hausman 
Test 















































































Adjustment -0.26   
(-8.25)***
 
 -0.20   
(-8.04)***
 

















           
N  43    43   43  
T  21    21   21  
N x T  903    903    903   
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test (H), which is p-value. ***, ** and * indicate 
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Table 8: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL  
Dependent Variable: Financial Development (Capital Market Development) 
Openness Proxy: Total Trade/GDP 














Model 1  Hausman 
Test 
Model 2  Hausman 
Test 
Model 3  Hausman 
Test 





































































 -0.03   
(-2.19)***
 
 -0.29   
(-4.32)*** 
 
Joint Hausman   












         
With Interaction 
Term 
Model 4  Hausman 
Test 
Model 5  Hausman 
Test 
Model 6  Hausman 
Test 













































































Adjustment -0.33   
(-2.77)***
 
 -0.25   
(-2.66)***
 
 -0.27   
(-4.23)*** 
 
Joint Hausman   












         
N  22   22  22  
T  21   21  13  
N x T  462    462    286   
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test (H), which is p-value. ***, ** and * indicate 
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Table 9: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL 
Dependent Variable: Financial Development (Banking Sector Development) 
Openness Proxy: Total Trade/GDP 













Model 1  Hausman 
Test 
Model 2  Hausman 
Test 
Model 3  Hausman 
Test 


































































Adjustment -0.43   
(-4.40)***
 
  -0.40  
(-4.17)***
 
















         
With Interaction 
Term 
Model 4  Hausman 
Test 
Model 5  Hausman 
Test 
Model 6  Hausman 
Test 










































































Adjustment -0.40   
(-4.25)***
 
  -0.35  
(-3.83)***
 

















         
N  16   16  16  
T  21   21  21  
N x T  336    336    336   
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test (H), which is p-value. ***, ** and * indicate 
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Table 10: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL 
Dependent Variable: Financial Development (Capital Market Development) 
Openness Proxy: Total Trade/GDP 



















Model 1  Hausman 
Test 
Model 2  Hausman 
Test 
Model 3  Hausman 
Test 


































































Adjustment -0.20   
(-2.17)**
 
 -0.19   
(-2.23)***
 
















           
With Interaction 
Term 
Model 4  Hausman 
Test 
Model 5  Hausman 
Test 
Model 6  Hausman 
Test 













































































Adjustment -0.29   
(-2.59)***
 
 -0.21   
(-1.75)*
 

















           
N  11   11   14   
T  21   21   13   
N x T  231    231    182   
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test (H), which is p-value. ***, ** and * indicate 
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Table 11: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL 
Dependent Variable: Financial Development (Banking Sector Development) 
Openness Proxy: Import Duties/Total Imports 
Capital Inflows Proxy: Private Capital Flows 
 Liquid 
Liabilities 
  Private 
Sector 
Credit 





Model 1  Hausman 
Test 
Model 2  Hausman 
Test 







































































  -0.36  
(-3.51)***
 
















     
   
With Interaction 
Term 
Model 4  Hausman 
Test 
Model 5  Hausman 
Test 















































































Adjustment -0.39   
(-3.27)***
 
  -0.40  
(-3.74)***
 

















          
N  15  15   15   
T  21  21   21   
N x T  315    315    315   
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test (H), which is p-value. ***, ** and * indicate 
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Table 12: Pooled Mean Group Estimation for ARDL 
Dependent Variable: Financial Development (Capital Market Development) 
Openness Proxy: Import Duties/Total Imports 
Capital Inflows Proxy: Private Capital Flows 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
  Total Share 
Value 
Traded 






Model 1  Hausman 
Test 
Model 2  Hausman 
Test 
Model 3  Hausman 
Test 




































































  -0.20  
(-2.26)**
 
















      
   
With Interaction 
Term 
Model 4  Hausman 
Test 
Model 5  Hausman 
Test 
Model 6  Hausman 
Test 













































































Adjustment -0.30   
(-3.72)***
 
  -0.35  
(-3.60)***
 

















         
N  12   12  14  
T  21   21  13  
N x T  252    252    182   
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistic except for Hausman test (H), which is p-value. ***, ** and * indicate 
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Appendix I 
Table AI: Definition and Source of the Data 
Variable Definition  Source 
Liquid Liabilities/GDP (%) 
(1980 – 2000, N = 43)) 
- Liquid liabilities the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus 
transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings deposits, 
foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase 
agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial 
paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents. 
World Development Indicator 
(World Bank CD-ROM, 2002) 
 
Private Sector Credit/GDP (%) 
(1980 – 2000, N = 43)) 
- Financial resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of 
non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a 
claim for repayment.  
World Development Indicator 
 
Domestic Credit Provided by 
Banking Sector (%) 
(1980 – 2000, N = 43)) 
- includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis.  The banking sector includes 
monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions 
where data are available (including institutions that do not accept transferable deposits 
but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits).  
World Development Indicator 
 
Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP 
(%) 
(1980 – 2000, N = 22)) 
Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of 
shares outstanding.  
Beck et al. (1999). 
 
Total Share Value Traded/GDP 
(%) 
(1980 – 2000, N = 22)) 




(1988 – 2000, N = 22) 
Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the 
country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. 
World Development Indicator 
 
Private capital flows, net total  
(US$) 
(1980 – 2000, N =43) 
Net private capital flows consist of private debt and non-debt flows. Private debt flows 
include commercial bank lending, bonds, and other private credits; non-debt private flows 
are foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. 
World Development Indicator 
 
Inflows of Capital (US$) 
(1980 – 2000, N = 16) 
Capital inflows (sum of foreign direct investment and portfolio inflows) divided by GDP  International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS), 
lines 78bed + 78 bgd 
Total Trade/GDP (%) 
(1980 – 2000, N = 43) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of 
gross domestic product. 
World Development Indicator 
 
Import Duties/Total Imports (%) 
(1980 – 2000, N = 15) 
Import duties comprise all levies collected on goods at the point of entry into the country. 
The levies may be imposed for revenue or protection purposes and may be determined 
on a specific or ad valorem basis, as long as they are restricted to imported products. 
Data are shown for central government only. 
World Development Indicator 
 
Deposit Interest Rate (%) 
(1980 – 2000, N = 43)) 
Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time, or 
savings deposits. 
World Development Indicator 
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Appendix II 
 
Table AII: The List of Developing Countries 
 
N = 43 (Banking sector Development) 
1. Algeria  12. Gambia  23. Malta  34. Sri Lanka 
2. Bangladesh  13. Ghana  24. Malaysia  35. Syrian Arab Republic 
3. Bolivia  14. Guatemala  25. Mexico  36. Thailand  
4. Botswana  15. Honduras  26. Morocco  37. Togo 
5. Cameroon  16. India  27. Niger  38. Trinidad and Tobago 
6. Chile  17. Indonesia  28. Nigeria  39. Tunisia 
7. Costa Rica  18. Jamaica  29. Pakistan  40. Turkey 
8. Cote d’lvoire  19. Jordan  30. Papua New Guinea  41. Uruguay 
9. Ecuador  20. Kenya  31. Philippines  42. Venezuela 
10. Egypt  21. Korea  32. Senegal  43. Zimbabwe 
11. El Salvador  22. Malawi  33. Sierra Leone   
Note: Argentina and Brazil are not included in the sample due to these two countries have very high interest rate in 
1990s and this may create an outlier and distort the model equilibrium. 
 
N = 22 (Capital Market Development) 
1. Chile  12. Morocco 
2. Cote d'Ivoire  13. Nigeria 
3. Egypt  14. Pakistan 
4. India  15. Philippines 
5. Indonesia  16. Sri Lanka 
6. Jamaica  17. Thailand  
7. Jordan  18. Trinidad and Tobago 
8. Kenya  19. Turkey 
9. Korea  20. Uruguay 
10. Malaysia  21. Morocco 
11. Mexico  22. Nigeria 
 